There is currently widespread concern that Britain's cultural and creative industries (CCIs) are increasingly dominated by those from privileged class origins. This stands in stark contrast to dominant policy narratives of the CCIs as meritocratic and open to all. Until now this debate has been clouded by a relative paucity of data on class origins. However, this paper draws on new social origin data from the 2014 Labour Force Survey to provide the first large-scale, representative study of the class composition of Britain's cultural workforce. The analysis demonstrates that CCIs show significant variation in terms of their individual 'openness', although there is a general under-representation of those from working class origins across the sector as a whole. This under-representation is especially pronounced in publishing and music, in contrast to, for example, craft. Moreover, even when those from working-class backgrounds enter certain CCIs, such as museums, galleries, libraries and IT, they face a 'class origin pay gap' compared to those from higher professional and managerial backgrounds. Finally, the paper discusses how these class inequalities in access and pay between individual CCIs point to particular occupational subcultures that resist aggregation into DCMS' broader category of CCIs. The paper concludes by suggesting the importance of disaggregating CCIs, particularly within policymaking, and rethinking the definition and boundaries of CCIs as a meaningful category.
Introduction
There is currently widespread concern that Britain's cultural and creative industries (CCIs), contrary to their image as emblems of a new, fluid and dynamic, 'knowledge economy', are increasingly dominated by those from privileged class origins (Hough, 2014; Plunkett, 2014) .
Public policy is beginning to take notice of these issues, with the UK's Arts Minister Ed
Vaizey making speeches and supporting initiatives to address questions of diversity in cultural production (Vaizey 2016) . Moreover, this concern is set against the backdrop of transatlantic concerns over Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic representation in cultural production (Revior 2016 ).
At present, however, the debates have generated more heat than light, with concerns over diversity often dismissed using individuals' anecdotes about their career successes and struggles (Sherwin 2016) Attempts to ground these debates in more empirical work struggle to find robust data. For those interested in the representation of different class groups within the CCI workforce this can be a particular problem. The most detailed data on the composition of the creative workforce, for example -provided by Creative Skillset (2013) and most recently by the UK's Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS 2015b) -lacks any information about social origin. This paper therefore capitalises on newly released data from the 2014 Labour Force Survey to provide the first large-scale, representative study of the class composition of Britain's cultural workforce. In doing so, the study returns to discussions of the meaning, definition and coherence of CCIs as a sector.
It makes three interventions. First, it rejects policy narratives portraying the CCIs as open and meritocratic. Instead, it demonstrates that those from working-class backgrounds are significantly under-represented within the CCIs. Investigating this further, it shows significant variation in the 'openness' of individual CCI sectors, noting in particular the social exclusivity of publishing and music and the relative openness of crafts. Second, it shows that even when those from working-class backgrounds enter certain CCIs, such as museums, galleries, libraries and IT, they face a 'class origin pay gap' compared to those from higher professional and managerial backgrounds. Third, reflecting on these distinct class inequalities in access and pay between individual CCIs, the article underlines the existence of particular occupational subcultures that resist aggregation into DCMS' broader category of CCIs. This latter point raises questions as to the very coherence of CCIs and problematizes future uses of this aggregate category.
The paper proceeds as follows. It begins with a short summary of the literature surrounding the nature of work within CCIs. Here, we consider two contrasting, if not contradictory, themes at the heart of the CCI narrative: first, that this occupational sector represents an open, meritocratic blueprint for a new form of post-industrial economy; and second that working conditions within CCIs are poor, with uncertain career prospects and low-or even no-pay. The former view is most closely associated with think-tank and policy discourses, while the latter has led academics interested in the structural conditions of CCI labour to question the meritocracy narrative altogether.
The analysis that follows this discussion directly addresses these two positions in turn, refuting the first and offering a new empirical basis from which to assess the claims associated with the second. Here we begin by exploring the employment profiles of the CCIs in the LFS data using descriptive statistics before turning to regression analysis in order to highlight the inequalities within the UK's CCI sector.
Taken together, these approaches indicate clear differences between the occupations that are currently aggregated together by policymakers to represent the economic performance of CCIs. The article concludes by linking the differences in occupational subcultures to the long running debate over how to define CCIs. These differences suggest that, by continuing to aggregate very different occupations, CCI policy will inevitably be inappropriate for all of the sectors included within DCMS' current category. The analysis suggests, therefore, that the question of what, if anything, binds these sectors together should be reopened, given the fact that the aggregate category of CCIs cannot be based on similarities of occupational structure and culture.
Creativity, Meritocracy and the CCIs
The CCIs, in the UK and elsewhere, have long been subject to claims about their economic potential. These claims have been rooted in how CCIs have been defined as a sector of the economy that can outperform other types of occupations, and -our substantive focus heretheir distinctively open and meritocratic nature (Florida's 2002 work is the canonical if much critiqued text on this point).
The current definition of CCIs uses the idea of creativity as the basis for claims about CCIs economic potential. Creativity has a dual role within the definition, linking seemingly diverse occupations, including the arts, software professionals and media work, as well as providing the basis for analysis of economic survey data. The most recent sets of these figures (DCMS 2014 , DCMS 2015a , 2015b 
And creativity is:
A role within the creative process that brings cognitive skills to bear to bring about a differentiation to yield either novel, or significantly enhanced products whose final form is not fully specified in advance' (NESTA 2013:24) The idea of creativity as the basis for occupational aggregation yields nine occupational clusters; Advertising and marketing; Architecture; Crafts; Design; Film, TV, video, radio and photography; IT, software and computer services; Publishing; Museums, galleries and libraries; Music, performing and visual arts. These occupations are closely related to a specific vision of work in a post-industrial economy, whereby work is centered on making a living based on citizens' capacity as creative individuals. The citizens' role is not to produce material goods, such as cars, washing machines or foodstuffs. Rather the immaterial products associated with services and intellectual property are at the heart of work in this version of the modern British economy.
As McRobbie (2015) has suggested, this is simultaneously a narrative that promotes an idea of the culture of work in the CCIs as one in which creativity is located as a central mechanism of la carrière ouverte aux talents. In other words the 'creative' job is supposedly open to everyone. In British policy and practice discourses, where citizens are rarely described as anything other than innately creative (O'Brien 2014), it is then a short step, within policy and practices discourses, to suggest that those who are able to make a living by capitalizing on their creativity are simply reaping the just desserts of talent and skill.
Creative work can, therefore, be read as intertwined with ideas of meritocracy prevailing broadly across modern economic and social organization (O'Brien 2014 , Littler 2013 .
The most powerful account of the meritocratic character of creative work was famously provided by Richard Florida, in his account of the rise of the 'creative class ' (2002) . Florida argued that the economic advantage of cities in the 'new age of creativity' is increasingly bound up with their ability to attract a cohort of young, highly educated workers with specialist forms of creative, technical knowledge. Crucially, this involves facilitating an environment that aligns with what Florida identifies as this group's core characteristics; namely, its diverse origins, social connectivity, cultural eclecticism and meritocratic ethos (see O'Brien 2014 and Miles 2016 for critiques of these characteristics). Following in the wake of Florida's analysis, various think tanks and policy documents have narrated the CCIs as a dynamic, highly skill-based, sector of the economy, especially symbolic of meritocratic recruitment and working practices, which are in turn considered to be crucial to the sector's success (Work Foundation 2014).
Sociological and cultural studies accounts of the creative industries have subjected these claims to detailed criticism. Most notably, scholars have questioned both the working conditions found in CCIs (Hesmondlagh and Baker, 2010; McRobbie, 2002) , and also the narratives of meritocracy attached to those who work in these sectors of the economy. In the United States Koppman's (2015) work has shown how shared cultural tastes correlated with middle class backgrounds are highly influential in hiring practices within CCIs, concurring with Rivera (2015) that hiring is, in effect, a form of cultural matching rather than a meritocratic exercise. Moreover this meritocratic narrative serves to obscure structural inequalities associated with gender (Gill 2002), class (Friedman et al 2016) and other forms of discrimination (Littler 2013) .
The notion that the UK creative occupational field is socially open or meritocratic is also challenged by more contemporary accounts of its diversity and accessibility from within cultural policy studies (e.g. Allen et al 2010 , Social Market Foundation 2010 . This research highlights inequalities associated with gender and ethnicity, with a recent review of the literature by O'Brien and Oakley (2016) demonstrating structural inequalities resulting from organisational issues, work patterns, hiring practices, and -a central focus in this paperdiscriminatory pay gaps (Creative Skillset, 2012; 2013) .
Work examining the role of class inequality within the CCIs is markedly less developed. As highlighted recently by O'Brien and Oakley (2016) , this is in large part due to the lack of large-scale representative data documenting the class origins of those working in the CCIs.
There is, however, an important body of work that probes the way class connects to occupational access in specific CCIs. This has focused on the classed nature of particular educational pathways (e.g. Banks & Oakley, 2015; Scharff, 2015; Bull, 2014; Allen, 2014 ) the way the privileged often draw upon powerful social networks in forging cultural careers (Grugulis & Stoyanova, 2006; Nelligan, 2015) , or the significant barriers to entry faced by those from working-class backgrounds attempting to move into the CCIs (Randle et al, 2014, Eikhof and Warhurst 2012; Friedman et al 2016) .
Even more recently, Miles (2016) has drawn on the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) to provide arguably the most detailed understanding of the social composition of Britain's cultural occupations. Drawing on the work of Grusky and his various collaborators (e.g. Sorensen 1998, Grusky and Weedon 2008) , Miles explores the 'micro class' dimensions of occupations in the creative sector, using GBCS data to compare their recruitment profiles, assets (in terms of economic, social and cultural capital) and values. His findings suggest that there are considerable variations in experience, resource and outlook, even between the occupational groups that Florida includes in his 'super-creative core'. This point is in keeping with longstanding debates over the definition and demarcation of CCIs (Campbell 2013) , a matter with which this paper engages in its penultimate section. This paper seeks to extend Miles' work in two key empirical directions. First, by drawing on the LFS, we provide the first nationally representative picture of the class composition of Britain's CCIs -as well as how this relates to inequalities of gender, ethnicity and education.
Second, drawing on the feminist concept of the 'glass ceiling', we look at earnings of employees within the CCIs and how these may be affected by class origin. For example, recent work (Friedman and Laurison forthcoming) has identified that even when those from working-class backgrounds are upwardly mobile into Britain's high-status occupations they face a 'class origin pay gap' that prevents them from enjoying equivalent earnings to those from intergenerationally stable backgrounds. More specifically, they find that those whose parents were employed in semi-routine and routine (NS-SEC 6-8) occupations earn on average £6000 less than colleagues from higher professional and managerial backgroundseven after controlling for a host of factors known to affect earnings. Here we therefore explore whether this finding of a 'class ceiling' also obtains in cultural work.
Data and Methods
As noted, we draw here on data from the Office of National Statistics' quarterly Labour Force Survey, specifically data pooled from four quarterly surveys from October 2013 to September 2014. We first used the DCMS Creative Industries Estimates (DCMS 2015a) to assign occupations (based on 4-digit SOC2010 codes) to nine sectors of the CCIs. The thirty individual occupations in each of these sectors are listed in Table 3 , with a total of 2201 respondents employed in these occupations when they responded to the survey. We then identified the respondents employed in these occupations who also responded to the social origin question in the July-September 2014 survey (1769 respondents). This question asks respondents the occupation of the main earner parent when they were 14. We then group respondents' social origin into four groups based on the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) classes; those with parents in NS-SEC 1 (higher professional and managerial occupations), in NS-SEC 2 (lower professional and managerial positions), NS-SEC 3, 4, or 5 (intermediate occupations or self-employed), or NS-SEC 6-8 (semi-routine, routine occupations, or unemployed). We also removed all those under 23 1 , in full-time education, or over 69, as the LFS collects data on those over 69 differently, since most people in this age group have moved into retirement. This leaves 1637 respondents in CCI occupations, and 918 who also have earnings information (862 with data on all covariates used in regression models).
It is important to note that the LFS does not collect earnings information for respondents who are self-employed; thus all reports of earnings below are only for those who are employees. The self-employed are included in our descriptive statistics below, but we are unable to say anything here about the situation for self-employed workers in the CCIs. It does, however, allow the analysis to comment on the class origins of all of those responding to this question within LFS. Appendix table A1 shows the proportion of workers in each sector in each NS-SEC category. Finally the analyses use the recommended survey weighting from the LFS in all analyses, but were replicated with no weighting and the results were found to be consistent; full descriptions of variables and other methodological notes are in the appendix.
Understanding the creative workforce: evidence from 2014 LFS

Who are the creative workers?
We begin our analysis with a descriptive portrait of the demographic composition of the different sectors that make up the CCIs in the UK (according to DCMS's definition). Table 1 thus reports the relative size of each sector among LFS respondents, their gender and ethnic makeup, and the percentage of workers with degrees. Table 1 demonstrates that IT, Software and Computer Services is by far the biggest employer, followed by advertising. Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates that these two sectors also have the highest average earnings within the sector, nearly £100/week more than the average for the CCIs as a whole.
[ (2015) report, our analysis demonstrates that women are significantly underrepresented in the CCIs, BAME groups are marginally underrepresented, and all workers are significantly better-educated than the population as a whole.
However, these aggregate figures hide significant variations by individual sector. For example, only the IT sector has a higher percentage of BAME employees than the general population, while every other creative occupation is more white than the UK as a whole.
There is also particularly acute under-representation of women in architecture, craft, film and TV, and IT.
Third, Figure 1 demonstrates that earnings for employees (as distinct from all workers) within the CCIs are much higher than the population as a whole. While much recent debate has focused on the precariousness and low-pay of cultural labour (Hesmondlagh and Baker, 2010; McRobbie, 2002) , Figure 1 suggests that the CCIs actually offer rates of pay close to that of higher managers and professionals (NS-SEC 1). Thus the weekly average earnings for those in the CCIs is £801, compared to £896 for those in NS-SEC 1, £582 for those in NS-SEC 2, and £522 in the workforce as a whole. This is partially explained by the fact that 33% of people in CCI occupations are themselves classed as higher managerial and professional, but even when these are excluded the CCI sector is still comparatively better paid than the labour force as a whole (the average pay of people in CCIs outside NS-SEC 1 is £613/week).
Again, though, this masks important inter-sector differences. In particular, occupations 
The Class Origins of the Cultural Workforce
While results so far echo relatively well-documented demographic and earnings inequalities within the CCIs, very little is known about how these map onto the class origins of those employed in the cultural sector. Table 2 therefore examines the social origins of those employed in the CCIs as a whole, and then shows how these compare to the origins of those in higher professional and managerial occupations (NS-SEC 1) and lower professional and managerial occupations (NS-SEC 2), in the population as a whole. Despite the dominant policy narratives of openness and meritocracy, Table 2 shows clearly that there is a significant under-representation of people from working class origins in creative occupations. While 34.7% of the UK population aged 23-69 had a parent employed in a routine or semi-routine working class occupation, the figure among those working in the CCIs is only 18%. This under-representation is mirrored by the comparative overrepresentation of those from professional and managerial backgrounds (that is, NS-SEC 1 and 2 combined: 50% in the CCIs vs 29.1% in the population). It is also telling that the CCI skew towards those from privileged backgrounds closely mirrors that of Britain's highest occupational class, NS-SEC 1 or higher managerial and professional occupations, which have long been subject to policy concerns about social exclusivity and elitism (Milburn, 2009; 2013; . Indeed these findings clearly puncture romantic notions of the CCIs as an exemplar of merit and accessibility and instead point towards a sector dominated by the children of managers and professionals.
[ Table 2 here]
One of the advantages of the large-sample LFS is that it allows for an unusually detailed investigation of how the distributions of class origins vary across different CCI sectors. Table   3 suggests that the CCIs are in no way a coherent formation in terms of their social composition. Some sectors, such as publishing, advertising, and music and performing and visual art, have a particularly high concentration of those from professional and managerial backgrounds (NS-SEC 1&2) whereas the distribution of the origins of those working in craft, by contrast, is much closer to what is found in the general population.
[ Table 3 here ]
Class, Gender and Pay
While Table 3 describes important variations in occupational 'openness' across different CCIs, another pressing question -in terms of meritocracy at least -is whether earnings variation exists for employees within the CCIs according to gender and class origin 2 . We use a series of multivariate linear regression models of earnings in the CCIs to answer this question. Table 4 The hidden barriers, or 'glass ceiling', preventing women from getting to the top of the CCIs are well documented Scharff, 2015; Conor et al, 2015; Skillset, 2010) . Table 4 shows that this glass ceiling or gender pay gap is emphatically confirmed in the LFS data:
female employees have average earnings of £239/week or over £12,000/year less than men (with similar class backgrounds) in the CCIs as a whole. Some of this pay gap is accounted for by differences between men and women in the CCIs; women in the CCIs are on average younger than men, more likely to work in the public sector and in other less-well-paid occupations within the CCIs, thus women have predicted earnings of £130/week less than men who are otherwise similar on the measures in the base model, and £112/week less than men net of all the controls in the full model. Nonetheless, net of all these controls this is still a substantial and statistically significant pay gap, with women employed in CCIs earning about £5800 less per year than otherwise-similar men.
In keeping with the rest of the analysis presented here, however, the picture is more mixed when drilling down into individual sector data. Table 5 reports the gender pay gap in each of the nine sectors of the CCIs in three ways: the pay for men and the difference for women (Column 1) without any controls; the difference between men and women after demographic and hours-worked controls only (Column 2, the same model as the 'base model' in Column 2 of Table 4) , and the full model (Column 3, again the same model as Column 3 in Table 4 ) We find that statistically significant gender pay gaps persist in Architecture, Crafts, Film TV & Radio, and IT, with estimates ranging from £97 to £288/week, or from about £5000/year in IT to nearly £15,000/year in Film and other media. Returning to Table 4 , this suggests that there is a class-origin pay gap within Britain's CCIs.
The first and second models return statistically significant and substantively meaningful differences in earnings between employees with parents in NS-SEC 1 occupations (the reference category) and those from NS-SEC 2 or NS-SEC 6-8 backgrounds: workers from working class origins have earnings on average £157/week or over £8100 less per year than demographically-similar people (working the same number of hours) from privileged backgrounds. However, these differences are much smaller, and statistically insignificant, in the full model; this suggests that earnings differences by origin are accounted for by differences in the educational levels, particular work contexts and occupations of those from working-class origins. That differences in earnings may be accounted for by education levels and working context should, in itself, be a major cause for concern given what recent sociological research has suggested on the links between class and education, class and occupation, and class and geography (Savage 2015).
[ Table 5 about here]
Finally, in Table 6 we turn to the evidence of 'class ceilings' in individual sectors of the CCIs.
Here, we show the differences between employees from privileged NS-SEC 1 origins and everyone else, that is employees whose parents were in any other NS-SEC category below NS-SEC 1. There are statistically significant differences in pay, net of all controls, for those from backgrounds outside NS-SEC 1, in Film, IT, and Publishing, ranging from £117/week to £444/week or about £23,000/year. Conversely, there is also a class origin bonus of £189/week in Advertising.
All of these estimates of class and gender differences in earnings, especially in individual sectors with small numbers of respondents, are necessarily approximate, and change somewhat depending on the particular covariates in each model. Further, none of these regression models can identify the causes of these discrepancies. They are, however, clear indications that there are both gender and class-origin income inequalities facing employees in many of the CCIs, and that these are not accounted for by measurable differences between women and men, or between people from different class origins.
Conclusion: Rethinking CCIs.
DCMS' (2015a, 2015b) most recent economic estimates suggest CCIs are a well performing area of the economy. This makes them highly attractive to policy makers looking for a vision of the future for a British economy increasingly dependent on service sector occupations (Engelen et al 2011). Indeed, some elements of the findings from this paper support a picture of CCIs as well remunerated, even, in the case of advertising, giving better pay to those employees from non-elite class origins. However, the main thrust of the narrative is that important questions remain about how far the economic success of the CCIs rests on common set of socio-cultural foundations. Indeed, it is in those occupations most closely associated with the arts, such as Film, TV, radio and photography, that employee wage differences based on social origins are most pronounced. Even where the working class or women are able to make it as employees in this sector they face lower wages associated, as suggested by the analysis of the Labour Force Survey, with their class or their gender.
The uneven distribution of diverse social groups working within CCIs, alongside the disparities in rewards, suggests two things. First is the intersectional nature of inequalities in the CCI labour force (an issue addressed at length by Oakley and O'Brien 2016 Conor et al (2015) and Hesmondhalgh and Saha (2013) , is needed to fully detail both the operation of these intersections and how they vary over time Moreover, the 'good' economic news about the CCIs is substantively driven, as Campbell (2013) has noted, by two sectors: IT and Advertising. Our analyses in Table 1 and Figure 1 above reiterate the longstanding point that IT, Software and Computer Services is by far the biggest employer, followed by advertising. These are also the best-remunerated occupational groups. The fact that they represent the best-paid cultural professionals, and together make up the 53% of the total CCI workforce, clearly shows how their inclusion skews any understanding of the economic contribution and potential of the CCI sector as a whole.
This skewing of the CCIs economic contribution is echoed in our analysis of their in internal inequalities. As we noted with regard to Table 3 Note: Weighted percentages based on recommended survey weighting. All respondents reporting an occupation assigned to a CCI sector, aged 23-69 and not in full-time education. Note: Weighted percentages based on recommended survey weighting. All respondents reporting an occupation, aged 23-69 and not in full-time education. N= 1637 for CCIs, and 5491 for NS-SEC 1, 9,614 for NS-SEC 2, and 45,356 for population as a whole. N 877 862 Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01. The second column shows the results of a regression with only demographic variables and number of hours worked (plus dummy variables for which the quarter in which the respondent reported their income and occupation, not shown). The second column includes a full range of controls, including dummies for quarters and individual occupations within the CCIs (not shown). Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01. The first column gives the average income for men, no controls; the next column gives the difference between the average earnings for men and those for women without any controls. The third and fourth columns give the coefficients for women in each sector from models with the same covariates as columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 , respectively. Column 4 thus gives the estimated gender penalty net of controls for age, class origin, working in London, ethnicity, education, hours worked, firm size, public vs private sector, job tenure, training, and specific occupation within each creative industry. Non-significant or otherwise unreliable coefficients are in light grey. Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01. The first column gives the average income for people from NS-SEC 1 origins, no controls; the next column gives the difference between the average earnings for privileged-origin people and those with parents in any other NS-SEC category, without any controls. The third and fourth columns give the coefficients for NS-SEC 2-8-origin people in each sector from models with the same covariates as columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 , respectively. Column 4 thus gives the estimated class-origin penalty net of controls for age, class origin, working in London, ethnicity, education, hours worked, firm size, public vs private sector, job tenure, training, and specific occupation within each creative industry.
Data and Methodology Appendix Data note
The UK Labour Force Survey has a uses a rolling panel survey design, with each respondent contacted in five consecutive quarters, but earnings only reported by each respondent in their 1 st and 5 th quarters of participation. Thus, the July-September LFS Quarterly survey data only contain earnings information for two-fifths of respondents willing to give earnings data (those who were in their first or fifth survey-wave); in order to obtain a larger sample size for these analyses, data were obtained with a special user license from the UK Data Archive at Essex University, with permission from the Office of National Statistics. These records contained individual-level identifiers allowing us to link respondents for whom July-September 2014 was their 2 nd , 3 rd , or 4 th wave to their first wave in the survey, and thereby obtain a 4-quarter pooled dataset with earnings data for all eligible respondents. Earnings compared in these models are thus from four different consecutive quarters in 2013-14, however results for models run on each wave separately return substantively identical results to those reported , and we include a dummy variable for survey wave/earnings-reporting quarter in all regressions we report. Weighting: the Labour Force Survey provides two weights with each survey: one for making inferences about earnings to the population of employed persons, and another for inference about anything other than income. However, the earnings weight provided was calculated based only on each quarter's respondents, and is inappropriate for use with the pooled data; instead, we use the person weight (pwt14) given for each respondent in the July-September 2014 quarter, which accounts for attrition in responses over the five waves of the survey and other aspects of survey design. On comparing these results to those with the earnings weight (piwt14) and without weights, we found there to be no meaningful differences.
Variable definitions and notes Exact question wordings available from the Office of National Statistics at http: //www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specific/labourmarket/labour-market-statistics/volume-2---2014 .pdf. NS-SEC categories and Professional vs Managerial: from nsecm10 and nsecmj10 Origin: from smsoc10, using Office of National Statistics Table 10 (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/classifications/current-standardclassifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec--rebased-on-soc2010--usermanual/index.html) to assign parents' 4-digit occupations to NS-SEC classes; for the 325 cases with only 3-digit soc10 origin codes, matched them to the NS-SEC class for the largest number of 4-digit codes within that 3-digit code. The 1057 respondents with only 2-digit or 1-digit origin codes were not included in these analyses. NS-SEC Classes (including higher professional vs higher managerial distinction): from nsecm10 and nsecmj10. Occupations and Occupational Groups: from soc10m, for respondents with 4-digit occupational codes, grouped all those in creative and cultural industries occupations into 9 groups. Earnings: from grsswk for weekly gross earnings. Age, Age squared from age in years. Weighting: While the LFS has separate weights for inferences about income and for other inferential analyses, the income weights provided are inappropriate because they do not correct for attrition from the survey, while the person-weights provided for respondents in the quarter in which they answered the origin variable do take this into account. In these analyses, therefore, we use the person-weights, but results are substantively similar without weighting and with the income-specific weighting. 
